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Previous research underlines that a political system’s adherence to principles of
distributive and procedural justice stimulates citizens’ political trust. Yet, most of what
is known about the relationship between justice and political trust is derived from
macro-level indicators of distributive and procedural justice, merely presuming that
citizens connect a political system’s adherence to justice principles to their trust in political
authorities and institutions. Accordingly, we still lack a clear understanding of whether
and how individual perceptions and evaluations of distributive and procedural justice
influence citizens’ political trust and how their impact might be conditioned by a political
system’s overall adherence to principles of justice. In addition, previous research has
implicitly assumed that the link between justice principles and political trust operates
identically for all major political authorities and institutions, disregarding the possibility
that citizens evaluate representative and regulative authorities and institutions on the
basis of different justice criteria. Against this background, the aims of the present study
are (1) to investigate the impact of individual evaluations of distributive and procedural
justice on citizens’ political trust, (2) to analyze to what extent the effects of justice
evaluations on political trust depend on political systems’ overall adherence to principles
of distributive and procedural justice, and (3) to assess whether and in which ways the
influence of justice evaluations differs for trust in representative and regulative authorities
and institutions. Our empirical analysis covering more than 30,000 respondents from
27 European countries based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project demonstrates that (1) more positive evaluations
of distributive and procedural justice foster citizens’ political trust, that (2) the impact of
justice evaluations on political trust is amplified in political systems in which the overall
adherence to justice principles is compromised, and that (3) different facets of distributive
and procedural justice evaluations exert varying effects on citizens’ trust in representative
as compared to regulative authorities and institutions. These findings entail important
implications with regard to the relation between justice and political trust and the general
viability of modern democratic systems.
Keywords: political trust, distributive justice, procedural justice, justice evaluations, corruption, inequality,
democratic accountability, good governance
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INTRODUCTION
Democracy is inextricably linked with principles of justice. In
the long run, democratic systems will only thrive if they grant
citizens equal access to the political process and provide societal
outcomes that are considered just and fair by the citizenry.
A failure to do so might compromise the legitimacy of a
political system, with citizens feeling more dissatisfied with and
detached from the political process, turning less trustful of
politics, and being increasingly reluctant to voluntarily comply
with the decisions of political authorities and institutions (Tyler,
2006; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Uslaner, 2011; Marien and
Werner, 2019). For maintaining citizens’ legitimacy beliefs and
voluntary compliance—and to circumvent the more inefficient
and costlier alternative of governing by coercion—adherence
to basic principles of justice thus becomes imperative for any
democratic system.
In line with these assertions, previous research highlights
that violations of the basic principles relating to distributive
and procedural justice exert a sizable detrimental effect on
citizens’ legitimacy beliefs, most notably their political trust.
Theoretically, distortions of distributive and procedural justice
have been argued to exist when societies exhibit high levels
of income inequality or when practices of corruption, such as
bribery or the abuse of public offices for private gains, are
widespread (Anderson and Singer, 2008, 572–573; Uslaner, 2011;
Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012, 741). Empirically, a myriad of
studies documents that citizens in countries plagued by rampant
income inequality and corruption are less trustful of political
authorities and institutions than their counterparts in more
equal and cleaner countries (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003;
Anderson and Singer, 2008; Krieckhaus et al., 2014; Zmerli and
Castillo, 2015). These findings underline that a political system’s
adherence to principles of distributive and procedural justice
matters for citizens’ political trust and that violations thereof
induce citizens to withhold their trust from political authorities
and institutions.
In this study, we expand on the findings of previous
research and examine in more detail to what extent and under
what conditions distributive and procedural justice influence
citizens’ political trust. Our overarching aim is to establish a
comprehensive picture of this relationship by simultaneously
investigating the impact of individual-level perceptions and
contextual-level indicators of distributive and procedural justice,
as well as their interplay in bringing about citizens’ political
trust. In doing so, our study addresses three blind spots of
previous research whose investigation promises to complement,
enrich, and qualify the insights generated by research to date
and thus to provide meaningful insights on the ways in which
modern democracies can invigorate or undermine citizens’
legitimacy beliefs.
First, we know surprisingly little on how individual
perceptions and evaluations of distributive and procedural
justice shape citizens’ political trust. Most of what is known
about the relationship between justice and political trust is
derived from macro-level indicators capturing political systems’
adherence to principles of justice, thus largely neglecting the
role and relevance of individual justice evaluations (Citrin and
Stoker, 2018, 60). However, if a political system’s adherence to
justice principles is supposed to affect citizens’ political trust,
it is through individual justice perceptions and evaluations,
rendering an explicit analysis of said perceptions and evaluations
indispensable. To date, only a few studies have investigated the
impact of such evaluations on political trust. Yet, these studies
have focused either on evaluations of distributive or procedural
justice (cf. Linde, 2012; Loveless, 2013; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015;
Marien and Werner, 2019), leaving the question on their relative
weight in citizens’ trust calculus unanswered. Therefore, the first
goal of this study is to systematically investigate the impact of
individual evaluations of both distributive and procedural justice
on citizens’ political trust.
Second, we know little about the context dependency of
the relationship between justice evaluations and political trust
across political systems that themselves differ in their actual
adherence to principles of justice. Theoretically, living under
unjust conditions may either amplify or attenuate the impact
of individual justice evaluations on political trust (Goubin and
Hooghe, 2020, 222–224). Empirically, Zmerli and Castillo (2015)
show that individual justice evaluations are less influential for
citizens’ political trust in political systems that deviate more
strongly from principles of distributive justice (see also Goubin
and Hooghe, 2020), while other studies do not find such
conditional effects across political systems (Loveless, 2013).
However, these findings disregard evaluations of procedural
justice and their possibly varying effects on political trust
across political systems. Hence, the second goal of this study
consists in analyzing the micro–macro conditionality pertaining
to the impact of individual justice evaluations on political
trust across political systems exhibiting a varying adherence to
justice principles.
Third, we know little about how individual justice evaluations
relate to citizens’ trust in different authorities and institutions.
Most existing studies rely on one-dimensional conceptions of
political trust (Marien, 2017), implicitly assuming that the link
between justice principles and political trust operates identically
for all major political authorities and institutions of modern
democracies. Yet, this assumption may be too simplified for the
complexity of modern democratic systems in which different
types of authorities and institutions—such as representative and
regulative ones—are responsible for very different tasks and
thus are likely to be evaluated on the basis of different justice
criteria (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Schnaudt, 2019, 41–48).
Accordingly, the third and last goal of this study is to assess
whether and in which ways the influence of individual justice
evaluations differs for trust in representative and regulative
authorities and institutions.
The empirical analysis of this study is based on individual-
level data from the ninth round of the European Social Survey
(ESS) collected in 2018/19, combined with country-level data
provided by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project
(Coppedge et al., 2020). Overall, our combined data source
allows for an encompassing empirical test of our theoretical
propositions based onmore than 30,000 respondents from a total
of 27 European countries.
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The remainder of this study is structured as follows.
The Theory and Hypotheses section clarifies the conceptual
underpinnings of justice and political trust, develops the main
theoretical arguments, and specifies testable hypotheses on the
impact of justice (evaluations) on citizens’ political trust. The
section on Data, Operationalization, and Methods discusses the
data, operationalization, and methods applied in the empirical
analysis. The Analysis section presents the main empirical
findings. The concluding section summarizes the main insights
generated by this study, discusses their broader implications, and
outlines possible avenues for future research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Conceptual Framework
The main arguments presented in this study pertain to the
question of whether and in which ways citizens’ trust in
political authorities and institutions responds to (evaluations of)
general principles of justice. Before specifying the nature of this
relationship in more detail, we clarify the conceptual foundations
underlying the notions of political trust and justice (evaluations).
Political Trust: Concept and Dimensionality
The concept of political trust establishes one of the major
building blocks within the broader scheme of political support
(Easton, 1975). Located between citizens’ endorsement of
democratic principles on the one hand and evaluations of specific
incumbents on the other, political trust is usually considered
a mid-range indicator of political support directed at the core
authorities and institutions of the political system (Norris, 1999).
Political trust thus depicts a vertical relationship between citizens
and those authorities and institutions that are responsible for
the development and implementation of public policies and laws,
such as political parties, the parliament, the government, public
administrations, the courts, and the police, as well as individual
officeholders within these institutions (Denters et al., 2007, 67;
van der Meer and Zmerli, 2017).
Concerning its substance, political trust captures the extent
to which political authorities and institutions—in both their
code of conduct and their tangible actions—live up to
citizens’ expectations about legitimate and effective governance
(Schnaudt, 2019, 37). Accordingly, political trust can be
characterized as both relational and evaluative, conforming to
more general understandings and formulae of trust in the form
of “A trusts B to do X” (Hardin, 2000; van der Meer and
Dekker, 2011, 96–97). In short, political trust “reflects evaluations
of whether or not political authorities and institutions are
performing in accordance with the normative expectations held
by the public. Citizen expectations of how government should
operate include, among other criteria, that it be fair, equitable,
honest, efficient and responsive to society’s needs” (Miller and
Listhaug, 1990, 358).
An ongoing and still unresolved debate in the scholarly
literature concerns the dimensionality of political trust (Fisher
et al., 2010; Hooghe, 2011; Schnaudt, 2019). Two different
perspectives can be distinguished that differ in their conclusions
on whether or not citizens make a distinction between
different (types of) political authorities and institutions when
granting or withholding their political trust. The dominant,
mostly empirically driven perspective suggests that citizens’
trust in different authorities and institutions establishes a one-
dimensional construct, rendering political trust a coherent and
generalized attitude that is largely independent from the concrete
authorities and institutions evaluated (Hooghe, 2011; Marien,
2011, 2017). The second perspective, usually relying on a mix
of both theoretical arguments and empirical findings, contends
that, when it comes to their political trust, citizens differentiate
between representative and regulative types of authorities and
institutions. According to this perspective, citizens distinguish
between authorities and institutions that are responsible for the
development of public policies and laws, such as politicians,
political parties, and parliaments, and those that are concerned
with the implementation and execution of public policies and
laws, including civil servants, public administrations, the courts,
and the police (Gabriel et al., 2002, 180–181; Denters et al., 2007;
Schnaudt, 2013, 2019).
We take sides with the second perspective and rely on a two-
dimensional conception of political trust differentiating between
trust in representative and regulative authorities and institutions.
From a theoretical perspective, previous studies have argued
that representative and regulative authorities and institutions
differ with regard to their respective functions and purpose,
and therefore, citizens’ expectations and evaluation criteria are
likely to vary between both types of authorities and institutions
(Seligman, 1997, 28–29; Sztompka, 1999, 55; Rothstein and
Teorell, 2008, 175–177; Schnaudt, 2019, 45–46). In addition,
there are empirical reasons that question the appropriateness
and dominant use of one-dimensional conceptions in previous
research. First, the empirical results on the one-dimensionality
of political trust presented in previous studies oftentimes
hint at deviations from a clear one-dimensional structure
(Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck, 2002, 57, fn. 25; Zmerli, 2004,
233; Zmerli et al., 2007, 64, fn. 11). Second, one-dimensional
scales of political trust usually account for only a small proportion
of the variance in citizens’ trust in regulative authorities and
institutions (Marien, 2011, 18–20; Schnaudt, 2019, 47; Schnaudt,
2020a, 229–230). Hence, they leave it open to debate whether we
can meaningfully speak of political trust as a one-dimensional
construct if major regulative authorities and institutions of
modern democracies are not part of it.
Overall, there are thus convincing theoretical and empirical
arguments that render a distinction between these two types of
political trust a promising avenue for generating new insights on
the role and relevance of political trust in modern democracies.
In the present study, relying on a two-dimensional conception of
political trust allows us to empirically explore and detect possibly
varying effects of (evaluations of) justice on citizens’ trust in
representative and regulative authorities and institutions.
Justice (Evaluations): Conceptual Models
Justice research distinguishes two broad conceptions according
to which the allocation of resources and burdens in a society
can be characterized as just and fair (Tyler and Lind, 1992,
121–123). Distributive justice pertains to the fair distribution of
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resources and opportunities within society. As such, it refers
to the distribution of material goods, such as income or social
benefits, as well as to questions about equality of opportunity with
regard to individuals’ long-term life chances, including access
to education, the job market, or health care. When it comes to
evaluations of distributive justice, individuals compare the actual
allocation of resources and opportunities with an allocation
they would perceive to be fair1. Based on the results of this
comparison, they either evaluate a distribution as fair or identify
an over- or under-compensation (Jasso et al., 2016).
Procedural justice takes a step back and focuses on the
quality of the process by which a distributive decision is reached
(Abdelzadeh et al., 2015, 255–257; Grimes, 2017, 257–259).
Instrumental models of procedural justice define procedural
or structural conditions of fair decision-making. One of the
most fundamental conditions in these models is a person’s
control over the decision-making process or the actual decisions
made (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). In addition, Leventhal
(1980) proposes six justice rules for evaluating the fairness
of allocation processes. An allocative procedure is fair if it is
consistently applied across persons and over time, precludes bias
or self-interest, and is based on accurate and comprehensive
information. Furthermore, fair procedures should provide the
opportunity to correct decisions, reflect the interests and values
of all affected subgroups, and respect moral and ethical values.
Relational models of procedural justice consider fair processes
as a function of the quality of the relationship between
individuals and authorities. Here, procedures are evaluated
using three criteria: whether they convey a person’s positive
standing in a group, whether they treat a person politely and
respectfully, and whether they imply neutrality, i.e., a lack of
bias and discrimination against subgroups (Tyler and Lind,
1992). Individuals’ evaluations of procedural justice ultimately
reflect the extent to which they perceive political processes to
correspond with the above criteria.
Next to the distinction between distributive and procedural
justice as dominant types, the scope of justice conceptions
is relevant. Here, the literature has distinguished between
egocentric (self-regarding) and sociotropic (other-regarding)
justice attitudes (Jasso, 1999; Kluegel and Mason, 2004).
Both differ with regard to the main reference points of
justice evaluations, with egocentric evaluations being directed
toward the personal situation of an individual and sociotropic
evaluations aimed at the society and societal conditions as
a whole.
In summary, the present study relies on a multi-dimensional
conceptualization of justice. At the country level, we distinguish
between a political system’s actual adherence to principles of
distributive and procedural justice, such as providing citizens
with equal access to basic resources and opportunities or avoiding
1Individuals’ images or normative ideals of how the allocation of resources and
opportunities in society should look like are themselves derived from overarching
justice principles, such as merit, equality, or need (Törnblom and Foa, 1983;
Törnblom and Kazemi, 2012). In this study, what matters is whether or not citizens
consider the distribution of resources and opportunities as fair, rather than the
specific reasons for why they might do so.
corrupt practices as part of governing, respectively. At the
individual level, we focus on citizens’ perceptions and differentiate
between egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of distributive
and procedural justice.
Political Trust and Distributive and
Procedural Justice
The explicit references to citizens’ expectations about legitimate
and efficient governance as well as to the evaluation criteria
“fairness” and “equitability” in definitions of political trust
evidently point to a relationship between matters of justice
and citizens’ trust in political authorities and institutions.
With their decisions on and implementation of policies related
to the economy and social welfare, political authorities and
institutions do not only determine overall levels of distributive
and procedural justice in a polity. Rather, they also directly
influence what citizens may think about the realization of justice
in their country (Zmerli and Castillo, 2015, 182). Therefore, it is
not only plausible that citizens attribute responsibility to political
authorities and institutions for matters related to justice (Zmerli
and Castillo, 2015, 190; Goubin and Hooghe, 2020, 220) but also
that their political trust is a function of both (1) their individual
justice perceptions and evaluations as well as (2) their political
system’s actual adherence to principles of justice.
Political Trust and Individual-Level Justice
Perceptions
Although matters of performance, process, and probity as core
elements of “master P” feature center stage in most political
explanations of political trust (Hetherington and Rudolph,
2015, 34–35; Citrin and Stoker, 2018, 58–60), perceptions and
evaluations of distributive and procedural justice as important
antecedents of political trust have so far only played a subordinate
or implicit role in the scholarly debate. The underlying premise
of explanations revolving around “master P” is that individuals’
political trust responds to whether political authorities and
institutions succeed or “fail to meet expected goals or follow
prescribed norms” (Citrin and Stoker, 2018, 57). As such,
evaluations of distributive and procedural justice can be generally
classified into the same category as other evaluations pertaining
to the performance of the political system, most notably
evaluations of economic matters (Weatherford, 1984). What is
more, evaluations of distributive and in particular procedural
justice also bear an apparent relation to process and probity.
Previous studies investigating the impact of process and probity
focused on the role of procedures, scandals, and corruption
in shaping political trust (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2001;
Bowler and Karp, 2004), all of which are phenomena that matter
for and should be reflected in evaluations of distributive and
procedural justice. However, as Citrin and Stoker (2018, 60) note,
“since scholars have not [yet] introduced perceptions of process
into the major national surveys, we know less about the topic
than we should.” Accordingly, while individuals’ perceptions of
distributive and procedural justice are generally compatible with
existing explanations of political trust highlighting performance,
process, and probity, encompassing (cross-national) evidence on
this relationship is still lacking to date.
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What then is the mechanism linking individual justice
perceptions to political trust? In this regard, the overarching
premise is that citizens assess the extent to which political
authorities and institutions live up to citizens’ justice expectations
and subsequently decide on whether or not these merit their
trust. When it comes to evaluations of distributive justice,
this implies that individuals compare the actual allocation of
resources and opportunities in society with an allocation they
personally would perceive to be fair (Jasso et al., 2016). For
evaluations of procedural justice, the same holds true with regard
to the actual quality and fairness of the political processes that
lead to the allocation of resources and opportunities. Ultimately,
citizens will grant or withhold their trust in political authorities
and institutions depending on whether or not they perceive the
actual resource allocation and quality of political processes to
correspond with their personal expectations about distributive
and procedural justice (Tyler et al., 1985, 702–703; Miller
and Listhaug, 1999, 213–214). If expectations and perceptions
align, citizens will extend their trust to political authorities and
institutions; if perceptions fail to meet expectations, citizens will
withhold their political trust (cf. Kimball and Patterson, 1997;
Schnaudt, 2019, 118–121). A crucial precondition underlying
this mechanism is that citizens attribute responsibility for
the perceived realization of distributive and procedural justice
in their country to the workings of political authorities and
institutions (Zmerli and Castillo, 2015, 190; Goubin and Hooghe,
2020, 220).
In line with the preceding assertions, previous studies show
that citizens with more positive evaluations of distributive
justice exert higher levels of political trust (Loveless, 2013,
484; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015, 188) and that particularly
sociotropic evaluationsmatter in this regard (Kluegel andMason,
2004, 825). With regard to evaluations of procedural justice,
previous empirical findings indicate that citizens are more likely
to endorse political leaders and place greater trust in legal
authorities or governmental institutions if they perceive the
procedures used to allocate resources and burdens to be fair
(Tyler et al., 1985, 1989; Linde, 2012; Marien and Werner, 2019).
In her comprehensive review and discussion of existing studies
investigating the impact of procedural justice evaluations on
political trust, Grimes (2017, 261) thus reaches the conclusion
that there is “a wealth of evidence that perceptions of procedural
fairness in decision-making processes are linked to higher levels
of political trust.”
An important caveat concerns the possibility of reversed
causality. While there are convincing arguments to expect that
political trust responds to justice evaluations, it is conceivable
that citizens’ trust in political authorities and institutions, at
least to some extent, influences perceptions and evaluations of
justice (Grimes, 2017, 261–262). While such concerns can hardly
be tackled in cross-sectional studies, earlier research relying
on panel data shows that the relationship either runs from
justice evaluations to political trust or that there is a reciprocal
relationship (Tyler et al., 1989; Grimes, 2006; Tyler, 2006). Most
importantly, then, none of these earlier findings invalidates
our presumed causal order running from justice evaluations to
political trust.
While existing research thus confirms the relevance of
individual justice perceptions as antecedents of political trust,
previous studies have usually focused either on evaluations of
distributive or procedural justice, leaving open the question about
their relative importance in shaping political trust. What is more,
many studies have been restricted to single countries, neglecting
a more general cross-national perspective. While Zmerli and
Castillo (2015) as well as Loveless (2013) and Kluegel and
Mason (2004) have provided first evidence for a broader set
of Latin American and post-communist countries, respectively,
encompassing evidence for European countries spanning both
distributive and procedural justice evaluations is missing. We
attempt to fill this gap by examining the impact of different
aspects of individual perceptions of justice, considering both
individuals’ evaluations of distributive decisions and the fairness
of political processes across a broad range of European countries.
To this end, we test the following hypothesis:
H1: The more positive citizens’ evaluations of distributive and
procedural justice, the higher their political trust.
Political Trust and Contextual-Level Justice
While citizens’ individual perceptions and evaluations of
distributive and procedural justice may be systematically related
to their political trust, they do not necessarily have to reflect
the actual realization of distributive and procedural justice in
a given political system. To arrive at an encompassing picture
on the relationship between justice and political trust, analyzing
the impact of contextual-level distributive and procedural
justice (next to individual-level perceptions thereof) thus seems
indispensable. In the following, we argue that citizens will be
more trustful in systems that adhere more strongly to principles
of distributive and procedural justice.
With regard to distributive justice, political authorities and
institutions influence the distribution and allocation of resources
in society in manifold ways: “through spending on public
services, public or subsidized jobs, by setting and enforcing wage
standards, or through implementing wage policies and curbing
rent-seeking practices” (Goubin and Hooghe, 2020, 220). With
their policy decisions on economic matters and public welfare,
political authorities and institutions exert a direct impact on
citizens’ daily lives, most notably by determining howmuch taxes
citizens have to pay or which social benefits they are entitled to. In
addition to this direct influence on the distribution of common
resources, political authorities and institutions also determine
the opportunity structure within society and, by implication,
the actual realization of equality of opportunity. For example,
the decisions taken by political authorities and institutions on
the shape of the education system to a large extent determine the
chances of citizens to acquire the education they aspire and, in the
long run, to get the jobs they want. These arguments suggest that,
depending on the exact content and shape of economic, welfare,
or education policies developed and implemented by political
authorities and institutions, these will have distinct implications
for the allocation of resources and the realization of equality of
opportunity within a given society. The actual distribution of
resources and equality of opportunity, in turn, can be expected
to influence citizens’ political trust, with citizens living in systems
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that adhere more strongly to principles of distributive justice
being more trustful.
Similar arguments can be advanced for the impact of
procedural justice. In line with one of the distinctive features
of procedural justice stating that individuals should exert
control over decision-making processes or have the opportunity
to influence decisions (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), here as
well political authorities and institutions have the means to
determine the extent to which citizens feel included in the
political process. Specifically, by designing transparent decision-
making processes, providing information and justification about
decisions, and granting citizens the chance to participate in the
political process, political authorities and institutions can actively
adhere to principles of procedural justice (Tyler et al., 1989;
Tyler, 2006; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Similarly, also in the
implementation stage of political decisions, political authorities
and institutions can abide to principles of procedural justice
by treating everyone in the same, impartial way (Rothstein
and Stolle, 2003, 2008; Linde, 2012). Depending on the extent
to which political systems implement fair procedures, citizens
can be expected to grant or withhold their political trust, with
citizens living in systems that abide more strongly to principles
of procedural justice exhibiting higher levels of political trust.
Previous studies analyzing the impact of contextual-level
distributive and procedural justice on political trust and
related attitudes have mostly focused on income inequality
and corruption as respective indicators. While the empirical
picture painted by these studies hints at a rather clear pattern
with the level of a country’s income inequality and corruption
impacting negatively on citizens’ trust in political authorities
and institutions (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Anderson and
Singer, 2008; Loveless, 2013; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015), a
simultaneous assessment of both country-level distributive and
procedural justice is outstanding. What is more, those studies
focusing on income inequality have missed important facets
of distributive justice that extend beyond the distribution of
material goods, most notably facets related to the realization
of equality of opportunity in a given country. In this study,
we address these issues by simultaneously investigating the
impact of a more comprehensive contextual-level indicator of
distributive justice capturing the equal distribution of resources
and opportunities as well as corruption (procedural justice)
on political trust. The following hypothesis concerning the
contextual-level impact of political systems’ actual adherence to
principles of distributive and procedural justice on political trust
will be tested:
H2: The stronger a political system’s adherence to principles
of distributive and procedural justice, the higher citizens’
political trust.
Political Trust and the Micro–Macro
Conditionality of Justice (Perceptions)
So far, we have been mainly concerned with direct effects of
distributive and procedural justice on trust in political authorities
and institutions, including both individual- and contextual-
level effects. Yet, to investigate in full detail in which ways
distributive and procedural justice are connected to political
trust, it is important to establish explicit links between individual-
level perceptions and evaluations and the actual realization of
distributive and procedural justice principles across political
systems (Grimes, 2017, 262). In the following, we argue that
citizens’ individual justice evaluations interact with a political
system’s actual adherence to distributive and procedural justice
in bringing about citizens’ political trust (cf. Krieckhaus et al.,
2014; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015; Goubin and Hooghe, 2020).
Specifically, we contend that a political system’s adherence
to (or violation of) principles of distributive and procedural
justice conditions the impact of individual justice evaluations
on political trust. We distinguish two opposing kinds of such
conditioning effects which themselves can be traced back to
two different theoretical perspectives: a self-interest, utilitarian
perspective and a system justification perspective (see also
Goubin and Hooghe, 2020, 222–224). The main difference
between both perspectives pertains to the question of whether or
not citizens attribute responsibility for the state of justice in their
country to political authorities and institutions.
From a self-interest, utilitarian perspective, it can be
expected that citizens’ evaluations of justice are more decisive
in determining political trust in countries where the actual
adherence to justice principles is compromised. The underlying
argument is the following: Political systems that are hampered
by a shortage of distributive and procedural justice are likely
to exacerbate existing differences between the haves and have-
nots, rendering citizens’ evaluations of justice more salient
and, consequently, more influential in their political trust
calculus. The assumption here is that citizens link the actual
levels of distributive and procedural justice in their country
to the workings of political authorities and institutions. For
political systems characterized by an unequal distribution of basic
resources and opportunities or rampant corruption, this implies
that those who evaluate the prevalent conditions as unfair (i.e.,
those likely to be disadvantaged by injustices) are particularly
critical and distrustful of political authorities and institutions
(cf. Hetherington and Rudolph, 2008). By contrast, those who
perceive such conditions as fair (i.e., the likely beneficiaries of
injustices) can be expected to be benevolent and trustful toward
authorities and institutions (Krieckhaus et al., 2014; Goubin
and Hooghe, 2020, 223). As an observable implication of these
arguments, the difference in political trust levels between citizens
with positive and those with negative justice evaluations should
be more pronounced in political systems that deviate more
strongly from principles of distributive and procedural justice
(i.e., systems with a more unequal distribution of resources
and higher levels of corruption). We refer to this as the
amplification hypothesis.
H3a: The impact of citizens’ justice evaluations on political trust
is amplified in political systems that deviate more strongly from
principles of distributive and procedural justice.
Following the system justification theory (Jost, 2019),
individual evaluations of justice are expected to matter less for
citizens’ political trust in political systems where the actual
realization of distributive and procedural justice is constrained.
The underlying premise for this expectation is that all citizens
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exhibit a general preference for living in a just political system,
irrespective of their socioeconomic status or social position (Jost
et al., 2003). When actual conditions evidently deviate from this
ideal, citizens engage in system justification, implying that they
“develop coping strategies, either actively, or subconsciously, to
deal with this situation. This especially occurs in situations where
[. . . ] injustices are endemic and when citizens feel powerless
to change the system” (Goubin and Hooghe, 2020, 223). Such
coping strategies primarily aim to reduce citizens’ cognitive
dissonances (Jost, 2019) that result from living under unjust
conditions, but wanting to live in a just and fair environment.
One possible coping strategy consists in shifting the object
of blame or responsibility attribution. For example, citizens
may refer to principles of individual responsibility rather than
blaming the political system and its authorities and institutions
for their personal circumstances or the overall state of justice in
their country (cf. Zmerli and Castillo, 2015, 190; Goubin and
Hooghe, 2020, 244). With this decoupling of justice concerns
from the workings of political authorities and institutions, also
the general link between justice and political trust is weakened.
As a consequence, citizens’ evaluations of distributive and
procedural justice can be expected to play a less decisive role
in their political trust calculus (see also Goubin, 2020, 272).
Following from the preceding discussion, the impact of justice
evaluations on political trust should be weaker in systems that
are hampered by low levels of actual distributive and procedural
justice. We refer to this as the attenuation hypothesis.
H3b:The impact of citizens’ justice evaluations on political trust
is attenuated in political systems that deviate more strongly from
principles of distributive and procedural justice.
Empirical evidence relating to the preceding discussion is
restricted to studies using income inequality as a contextual
indicator of distributive justice. Overall, the results of these
studies point in the direction of the attenuation hypothesis,
showing that the influence of citizens’ socioeconomic status
and evaluations of distributive (income) justice on political
trust are weaker in countries with higher levels of income
inequality (Krieckhaus et al., 2014; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015;
Goubin and Hooghe, 2020). In this study, we provide a more
encompassing test, focusing on the conditional interplay of
individual citizens’ evaluations of and political systems’ actual
levels of both distributive and procedural justice.
Figure 1 provides a summary of our research design and
hypotheses under investigation. At the individual level, we
expect citizens with more positive evaluations of distributive and
procedural justice to be more trustful of political authorities
and institutions (H1). Concerning contextual-level effects of
distributive and procedural justice, we expect citizens to
exhibit higher levels of political trust in political systems
that allocate resources and opportunities equally and that
rely on fair procedures in the political process (H2). Finally,
we expect the impact of individual justice evaluations on
citizens’ political trust to vary across political systems with
different levels of actual distributive and procedural justice (H3).
According to the amplification hypothesis, justice evaluations
will be more influential in systems that exhibit lower levels of
actual distributive and procedural justice (H3a). Following the
attenuation hypothesis, the effects of justice evaluations will be





For the empirical test of our hypotheses, we require data covering
both citizens’ political trust and their justice evaluations at the
individual level. The European Social Survey (ESS) contains
a standard series of questions on political trust comprising
representative and regulative authorities and institutions (for
a general overview of the ESS, see Schnaudt et al., 2014). In
addition, the ninth round of the ESS, 2018/19 implemented
a specific thematic module on “Justice and fairness,” which
provides a topical and comprehensive data basis for the research
questions at hand (ESS, 2018). The special module offers detailed
measurements on individuals’ perceptions of distributive justice
both in terms of income inequality and equal opportunities in
education or employment. Furthermore, it includes individuals’
evaluations of procedural justice in the political sphere. For
testing our hypotheses involving contextual-level indicators of
justice, we complement the ESS individual-level data with
country-level data compiled by the V-Dem project providing
information on the extent to which political systems themselves
adhere to principles of distributive and procedural justice
(Coppedge et al., 2020).
Political Trust
To measure our dependent variable political trust, the ESS
provides several items asking respondents how much they
personally trust five different political authorities and institutions
of the national political system. Respondents can indicate their
level of trust on an 11-point scale ranging from “0 no trust at all”
to “10 complete trust.” The specific authorities and institutions
covered are the following: politicians, political parties, the
national parliament, courts, and the police. In line with our
conceptual discussion on the distinction between representative
and regulative authorities and institutions, we construct two
additive indices. We operationalize trust in representative
authorities and institutions with an index of respondents’ trust
in politicians, political parties, and the national parliament
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91). As the ESS provides only two items
for measuring trust in regulative authorities and institutions, we
create an index of trust in the courts and the police (Cronbach’s
alpha= 0.80)2. For both indices, we retain the original scale range
from 0 to 10, with higher values representing higher levels of
political trust. These two indices serve as dependent variables in
our empirical analysis.
2With only five items, an informative structural analysis on the two-dimensionality
of political trust is hard to obtain. Nevertheless, when specifying an exploratory
factor analysis with two factors to be extracted, the empirical results largely confirm
the distinction between trust in representative and regulative authorities and
institutions (see also Schnaudt, 2019, 56–61; Schnaudt, 2020b).
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of research design and hypotheses.
Evaluations of Justice
We employ a differentiated measurement approach to capture
individual perceptions and evaluations of justice, aiming
to distinguish between different facets of distributive and
procedural justice as well as egocentric and sociotropic justice
evaluations (Tyler and Lind, 1992; Jasso, 1999).
Evaluations of Distributive Justice
For measuring evaluations of distributive justice, we make use of
several items referring to (1) income fairness and (2) equality of
opportunity with regard to education and employment chances.
Accordingly, our analysis contains a question on the fairness
of respondent’s own income: “Would you say your net pay/net
income from pensions/net income from social benefits and/or
grants is unfairly low, fair, or unfairly high?” as well as a
question on the income fairness of one’s general social group: “In
general, do you think the pay/incomes from pensions of people
who work/worked in the same occupation as you/incomes from
social benefits of people receiving social benefits in [country] is
unfairly low, fair, or unfairly high?.” Respondents could evaluate
these questions using a nine-point scale, ranging from “−4 low,
extremely unfair” over “0 fair” to “4 high, extremely unfair.”
To account for the non-linearity in the measurement scale
with more unfair evaluations at both extremes, we construct a
categorical variable with three categories combining (1) answers
on the negative side of the original scale (“unfairly low incomes”
comprising values −4 to −1), (2) answers on the positive side
of the original scale (“unfairly high incomes” comprising values
1 to 4), and (3) answers at the mid-point of the original scale
(“fair incomes”).
For measuring egocentric evaluations of equality of
opportunity with regard to education and the job market,
we rely on the following two items: “Compared to other people
in [country], I have had a fair chance of achieving the level of
education I was seeking” and “. . . I would have a fair chance of
getting the job I was seeking.” For sociotropic evaluations, we
rely on the following two items: “Overall, everyone in [country]
has a fair chance of achieving the level of education they seek”
and “. . . has a fair chance of getting the jobs they seek.” For
these four items, respondents could provide their answers using
an 11-point scale ranging from “0 does not apply at all” to “10
applies completely.” Since the two respective items for egocentric
and sociotropic evaluations of equality of opportunity are
strongly correlated (r = 0.51 and 0.60, respectively), we combine
them into two indices.
Evaluations of Procedural Justice
To operationalize evaluations of procedural justice, we rely on
an index of five items capturing different criteria fundamental
to a fair political process, including aspects of both instrumental
and relational models of procedural justice. First, respondents
are asked about the fairness of political procedures: “How much
would you say that the political system in [country] ensures
that everyone has a fair chance to participate in politics?”
Furthermore, respondents are asked to assess the impartiality of
political procedures by evaluating “How much the government
in [country] takes into account all citizens’ interest?” A third
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criteria concerns the question of having a voice in political
procedures, which is measured by two items: “How much would
you say the political system in [country] allows people like you
to have a say in what the government does?” and “How much
would you say that the political system in [country] allows
people like you to have an influence on politics?” Fourth, the
perception of transparency in political procedures is captured by
asking respondents: “How much would you say that decisions in
[country] politics are transparent, meaning that everyone can see
how they were made?” Respondents could evaluate each of these
questions using a five-point scale, ranging from “1 not at all” to
“5 a great deal.” A factor analysis of the five items yields a clear
one-dimensional solution. Based on these results, we construct
an additive index of procedural justice (Cronbach’s alpha =
0.84), with higher values indicating more positive evaluations of
procedural justice. Given the question wording of the five items
as well as the substantial correlations between them, a distinction
between egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of procedural
justice cannot be established3.
Contextual-Level Indicators of Justice
In addition to citizens’ evaluations of justice, we rely on country-
level indicators measuring a political system’s actual adherence
to principles of distributive and procedural justice. To capture
adherence to distributive justice, we rely on a composite index
measuring the equal distribution of resources in a country
provided by the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2020). The
index combines information on the equal provision of and access
to high-quality basic education and healthcare, the amount of
public goods spending, and the universal provision of welfare
services to all citizens. In comparison to previous studies that
mostly relied on income inequality (Kluegel and Mason, 2004;
Loveless, 2013; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015, 179), our study
thus makes use of a more encompassing operationalization
that extends beyond purely economic facets of distributive
justice. For measuring a political system’s actual adherence to
procedural justice, our analysis relies on the level of corruption
in order to capture deviations from fair and equal treatment
and more general violations of the impartiality principle in
a country (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Evidently, systemic
corruption is likely to affect the distribution of resources and
opportunities within society as well and thus could also be
considered an indicator of distributive justice. Yet, corruption
is tied to distributive justice via its deteriorating impact on the
quality of procedures only. Corrupt practices such as bribery
and embezzlement are the epitomes of bias and self-interest
and the exact opposites of procedural ideals such as neutrality,
impartiality, and respect for moral and ethical values. It is
through such practices that unfair allocations of resources and
opportunities might be incurred. Therefore, we treat corruption
as a procedural feature that, by diminishing the quality of how
3While the different individual-level measures capturing evaluations of
distributive and procedural justice are analytically distinct, they are empirically
correlated. The correlations range from 0.2 (evaluations of procedural justice and
evaluations of income fairness) to 0.5 (egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of
income fairness). None of our regression models is hampered by multicollinearity
problems, all VIFs range between 1 and 2.8.
distributive decisions are reached, may affect the fair allocation
of resources and opportunities within society. Drawing again on
the V-Dem project, we use as an indicator the political corruption
index covering bribery, embezzlement, and theft in different
branches of the political process, including executive, legislative,
judicial, and public sector corruption (Coppedge et al., 2020)4.
Both indices for distributive and procedural justice are based
on country-expert codings referring to the year 2018 and range
from 0 to 1, with higher values coded as representing more
unequal resource distributions and higher levels of corruption,
respectively5.
Control Variables
To reliably estimate the effects of justice (evaluations) on political
trust, we include several control variables. At the individual level,
respondents’ socioeconomic status can be expected to influence
both their justice evaluations and political trust (Goubin and
Hooghe, 2020). Therefore, we include respondents’ age, gender,
education, subjective assessment of their household income,
as well as satisfaction with the economy. Level of education
is measured as the number of years completed in full-time
education. Subjective income is measured with the question:
“Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how
you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” Respondents
could give their answer on a scale from “1 living comfortably on
present income” to “4 finding it very difficult on present income.”
Satisfaction with the economy is measured on an 11-point
scale ranging from “0 extremely dissatisfied” to “10 extremely
satisfied.” At the country-level, the overall macroeconomic
performance of a country has been shown to be an important
antecedent of individuals’ political trust (van Erkel and van der
Meer, 2016) and can be expected to influence a country’s overall
realization of distributive and procedural justice principles as
well. Therefore, we control for real gross domestic product per
capita (GDP per capita in 100k Euro) in 2018 (Eurostat, 2020).
Methods
We follow a factor-centric research design that aims to identify
the specific impact of distributive and procedural justice rather
than providing the most encompassing explanation of political
trust possible (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2007). Given
the nested structure of our data combining information on
both individuals and countries, our empirical analysis relies on
hierarchical linear regression models. We rescale all continuous
individual-level variables to range from 0 to 1. For the estimation
of cross-level interactions, we group-mean center all individual-
level variables and grand-mean center all country-level variables.
Across all models presented, we rely on the identical number of
cases to allow for straightforward comparisons across models and
4The results presented in this study are not sensitive to the specific corruption
indicator used. Using sub-indices provided by V-Dem or corruption indicators by
the World Bank or Transparency International leads to the same conclusions.
5Empirically, actual levels of distributive and procedural justice go hand in hand,
with both indices being positively correlated at r = 0.7 in our sample of European
countries (N = 27). See also footnote 3.
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findings. Overall, our analysis includes 34,335 respondents from
27 European countries6.
ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis is structured along two consecutive steps.
In the first step, we present the empirical findings pertaining to
the direct effects of distributive and procedural justice on citizens’
trust in representative and regulative authorities and institutions
(H1 and H2). In the second step, we outline our findings on
the conditional impact of justice evaluations on political trust
as a function of political systems’ actual adherence to justice
principles (H3a/b).
Direct Effects of Distributive and
Procedural Justice (Evaluations)
Table 1 summarizes the main findings pertaining to the impact
of justice (evaluations) on citizens’ trust in representative and
regulative authorities and institutions. Models 1a and 1b present
the results for trust in representative authorities and institutions
and models 2a and 2b for trust in regulative authorities
and institutions.
Models 1a and 2a assess the impact of citizens’ evaluations of
distributive and procedural justice (H1). As can be seen, more
positive evaluations of procedural justice as well as more positive
sociotropic evaluations of equality of opportunity are positively
related to trust in both types of authorities and institutions.
Egocentric evaluations of equality of opportunity are positively
related to trust in regulative authorities and institutions only.
For egocentric evaluations of income fairness, it is evident that
those who consider their own incomes as unfairly low are less
trustful of representative authorities and institutions, while those
considering their incomes as unfairly high do not differ in
their political trust from those who feel that their incomes are
fair. In comparison, egocentric evaluations of income fairness
are unrelated to trust in regulative authorities and institutions.
Finally, for evaluations of sociotropic income fairness, a different
picture emerges. Here, the results indicate that those who feel that
the political system allows whole occupational status groups to
be overcompensated with unfairly high incomes are less trustful
than citizens who perceive the incomes of their own occupational
group to be fair. This effect generalizes to both representative
and regulative authorities and institutions. In contrast, those who
feel that their occupational status group is undercompensated
with unfairly low incomes do not differ in their political trust
from those who consider such incomes as fair. Overall, the
results presented in models 1a and 2a generally confirm that
more positive evaluations of distributive and procedural justice
go hand in hand with higher levels of political trust, thus lending
support to H1.
At the same time, our results point to some important
qualifications of this general relationship. First, the effects of
procedural justice evaluations outweigh those of distributive
justice. This holds true for both trust in representative and
6For a complete list of countries included, see https://www.europeansocialsurvey.
org/data/country_index.html (accessed December 10, 2020).
regulative authorities and institutions7. Second, sociotropic
evaluations of justice appear to be more relevant for political
trust than egocentric ones, exerting largely consistent effects
on trust in representative and regulative types of authorities
and institutions. Third, evaluations pertaining to equality of
opportunity (both egocentric and sociotropic) play a relatively
stronger role with regard to trust in regulative as compared
to representative authorities and institutions. Fourth and last,
egocentric evaluations related to the fairness of personal
incomes are relevant for trust in representative authorities
and institutions, while being largely detached from trust in
regulative ones.
Turning to the results for models 1b and 2b, we have a
closer look at the contextual effects of a political system’s actual
adherence to distributive and procedural justice on citizens’
political trust (H2)8. As can be seen in model 1b, neither the
distribution of basic resources and opportunities nor corruption
as indicators of distributive and procedural justice exert a
statistically significant effect on citizens’ trust in representative
authorities and institutions (while simultaneously controlling
for individual evaluations of justice and macroeconomic
performance, i.e., GDP per capita). To inspect these findings
further, models 3–5 in the Supplementary Table 1 provide
results for incremental regression models estimating the effects
of resource distribution and corruption while not controlling
for GDP per capita. The findings indicate that both an unequal
resource distribution (model 3) and corruption (model 4) exert
the expected negative effects on political trust, with the latter
being more relevant than the former (model 5). Overall, the
results presented in model 1b in Table 1 thus suggest that,
ultimately, macroeconomic performance seems to matter more
for trust in representative authorities and institutions than
principles of both distributive and procedural justice. Therefore,
with regard to trust in representative authorities and institutions,
H2 has to be rejected.
Model 2b in Table 1 presents the corresponding findings
for trust in regulative authorities and institutions. The main
difference compared to the preceding results pertains to
the statistically significant negative impact of country-level
corruption that persists even after controlling for GDP per capita.
This observation not only suggests that for trust in regulative
authorities and institutions, a political system’s actual adherence
to procedural justice is more relevant than its adherence to
distributive justice but also that the realization of principles
of procedural justice in a given country matters beyond and
independently of a country’s macroeconomic performance9.
7Supplementary Tables 1, 2 provide the results of additional models,
incrementally including evaluations of distributive and procedural justice as
antecedents of political trust. These models show that evaluations of procedural
justice exhibit a stronger explanatory power than evaluations of distributive
justice, as indicated by the size of the individual-level variance components.
8The results of two empty models (not shown) signal that 19.5 and 20.7% percent
of the variance in individuals’ trust in representative and regulative authorities and
institutions, respectively, is located at the between-country level.
9Supplementary Table 2 shows that an unequal distribution of resources and
opportunities exerts a statistically significant negative impact on trust in regulative
authorities and institutions (model 3). This effect vanishes when simultaneously
controlling for country-level corruption (model 5).
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TABLE 1 | Distributive and procedural justice and political trust (direct effects).
Trust in representative Trust in regulative
authorities and institutions authorities and institutions
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
(Intercept) 3.82(0.20)*** 3.88(0.13)*** 5.71(0.21)*** 5.77(0.13)***
Individual-level predictors
Procedural justice 5.38(0.06)*** 5.38(0.06)*** 3.10(0.07)*** 3.11(0.07)***
Equality of opportunity (egocentric) 0.01(0.05) 0.01(0.05) 0.35(0.05)*** 0.35(0.05)***
Equality of opportunity (sociotropic) 0.53(0.05)*** 0.53(0.05)*** 0.79(0.06)*** 0.79(0.06)***
Income justice (egocentric): fair Reference Reference Reference Reference
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, low −0.05(0.03)* −0.05(0.03) −0.02(0.03) −0.02(0.03)
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, high 0.07(0.05) 0.07(0.05) 0.03(0.06) 0.03(0.06)
Income justice (sociotropic): fair Reference Reference Reference Reference
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, low −0.03(0.03) −0.03(0.03) −0.04(0.03) −0.04(0.03)
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, high −0.10(0.05)* −0.10(0.05)* −0.15(0.05)** −0.15(0.05)**
Subj. feeling about hh income −0.19(0.04)*** −0.19(0.04)*** 0.09(0.05)* 0.09(0.05)*
Satisfaction w/ economy 2.78(0.05)*** 2.78(0.05)*** 2.66(0.06)*** 2.66(0.06)***
Gender (female) 0.15(0.02)*** 0.15(0.02)*** 0.13(0.02)*** 0.13(0.02)***
Age 0.41(0.04)*** 0.41(0.04)*** 0.10(0.05)* 0.10(0.05)*
Education (years) 0.33(0.15)* 0.33(0.15)* −0.08(0.17) −0.08(0.17)
Country-level predictors
Unequal resource distribution 2.48(2.57) 1.35(2.61)
Corruption −0.76(1.04) −2.35(1.06)*
GDP per capita (in 100k Euro) 4.58(1.03)*** 3.16(1.05)**
BIC 131,553.12 131,552.06 140,641.69 140,638.24
N (individuals/countries) 34,335/27 34,335/27 34,335/27 34,335/27
Var: country level 1.04 0.43 1.17 0.44
Var: individual level 2.67 2.67 3.48 3.48
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Accordingly, with regard to trust in regulative authorities and
institutions, H2 receives empirical support for the impact of a
political system’s procedural justice, while it has to be rejected for
the impact of a system’s distributive justice.
Conditional Effects of Distributive and
Procedural Justice Evaluations
In the second step of our analysis, we turn to the investigation of
the micro–macro conditionality of justice evaluations as stated
in the amplification (H3a) and attenuation hypotheses (H3b).
Given the relatively high number of 10 cross-level interactions
to be estimated (five individual-level justice evaluations × two
contextual-level justice indicators) with only 27 second-level
units available, we opt for estimating separate models including
(1) interactions between individual justice evaluations and
country-level distributive justice (resource distribution) and (2)
interactions between individual justice evaluations and country-
level procedural justice (corruption)10.
10Supplementary Tables 3, 4 include additional models that simultaneously
estimate cross-level interactions involving resource distribution and corruption.
For trust in representative authorities (Supplementary Table 3), the results are
largely consistent with those shown in Table 2. For trust in regulative authorities
Table 2 presents the results of our analysis. Models
3a and 3b pertain to trust in representative authorities
and institutions, whereas models 4a and 4b refer
to trust in regulative authorities and institutions as
dependent variables.
At first glance, two general observations come to light. First,
the direction and pattern of the interaction effects observed
are almost identical for trust in representative and regulative
authorities and institutions. Looking at the statistical significance
of the interaction effects, however, it is evident that conditional
effects of individual justice evaluations are overall more relevant
with regard to trust in representative than in regulative
authorities and institutions. Second, for each type of political
trust, the pattern and direction of the interaction effects observed
are identical for resource distribution and corruption as the
two contextual-level moderating factors representing distributive
and procedural justice, respectively. When also considering the
statistical significance of the cross-level interactions, it is evident
that conditional effects of individual justice evaluations are
and institutions (Supplementary Table 4), some deviations exist with regard to
resource distribution as conditioning factor.
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TABLE 2 | Distributive and procedural justice and political trust (cross-level interactions).
Trust in representative Trust in regulative
authorities and institutions authorities and institutions
Model 3a Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b
(Intercept) 3.89(0.13)*** 3.89(0.13)*** 5.77(0.13)*** 5.77(0.13)***
Individual-level predictors
Procedural justice 5.39(0.06)*** 5.38(0.06)*** 3.09(0.07)*** 3.06(0.07)***
Equality of opportunity (egocentric) 0.02(0.05) 0.01(0.05) 0.35(0.05)*** 0.36(0.05)***
Equality of opportunity (sociotropic) 0.53(0.05)*** 0.53(0.05)*** 0.78(0.06)*** 0.77(0.06)***
Income justice (egocentric): fair Reference Reference Reference Reference
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, low −0.03(0.03) −0.01(0.03) −0.00(0.03) 0.01(0.03)
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, high 0.09(0.05) 0.11(0.05)* 0.03(0.06) 0.06(0.06)
Income justice (sociotropic): fair Reference Reference Reference Reference
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, low −0.05(0.03) −0.07(0.03)* −0.05(0.03) −0.06(0.03)*
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, high −0.13(0.05)** −0.14(0.05)** −0.17(0.06)** −0.17(0.06)**
Subj. feeling about hh income −0.19(0.04)*** −0.19(0.04)*** 0.10(0.05)* 0.11(0.05)*
Satisfaction w/ economy 2.78(0.05)*** 2.78(0.05)*** 2.64(0.06)*** 2.62(0.06)***
Gender (female) 0.15(0.02)*** 0.15(0.02)*** 0.13(0.02)*** 0.12(0.02)***
Age 0.41(0.04)*** 0.42(0.04)*** 0.10(0.05)* 0.09(0.05)*
Education (years) 0.31(0.15)* 0.30(0.15)* −0.07(0.17) −0.04(0.17)
Country-level predictors
Unequal resource distribution 2.70(2.59) 2.48(2.57) 1.00(2.62) 1.34(2.60)
Corruption −0.75(1.04) −0.75(1.05) −2.35(1.05)* −2.59(1.06)*
GDP per capita (in 100k Euro) 4.59(1.03)*** 4.58(1.03)*** 3.13(1.04)** 3.12(1.05)**
Cross-level interactions
Procedural justice X Resource distribution −2.69(0.74)*** 1.11(0.84)
Equality of opportunity (egocentric) × resource
distribution
−2.37(0.59)*** −1.01(0.68)
Equality of opportunity (sociotropic) × resource
distribution
2.86(0.68)*** 1.97(0.78)*
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, low × resource
distributiona
0.80(0.42) 1.04(0.48)*
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, high × resource
distributiona
0.96(0.89) 0.02(1.02)
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, low × resource
distributiona
−1.04(0.46)* −0.50(0.52)
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, high × resource
distributiona
−1.56(0.84) −1.29(0.96)
Procedural justice × corruption −1.13(0.26)*** 1.35(0.30)***
Equality of opportunity (egocentric) × corruption −0.82(0.20)*** −0.84(0.22)***
Equality of opportunity (sociotropic) × corruption 1.33(0.23)*** 1.57(0.26)***
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, low × corruptiona 0.58(0.15)*** 0.62(0.17)***
Income justice (egocentric): unfair, high ×
corruptiona
0.56(0.29) 0.34(0.33)
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, low ×
corruptiona
−0.57(0.17)*** −0.30(0.19)
Income justice (sociotropic): unfair, high ×
corruptiona
−0.45(0.27) −0.15(0.31)
BIC 131,579.18 131,567.56 140,686.62 140,630.63
N (individuals/countries) 34,335/27 34,335/27 34,335/27 34,335/27
Var: country level 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44
Var: individual level 2.67 2.67 3.48 3.48
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05. aReference category: income justice
(egocentric/sociotropic): fair.
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FIGURE 2 | Marginal effects of subjective evaluations of justice on trust in representative authorities and institutions, conditional on country-level corruption. All
predictions based on model 3b in Table 2.
overall more prevalent with regard to corruption rather than
resource distribution as moderating factors.
Given the identical pattern in the cross-level interactions
observed for both country-level moderators, we restrict our more
detailed assessment pertaining to the test of the amplification and
attenuation hypotheses (H3a/b) to corruption only11. To provide
a more intuitive discussion of our findings, Figure 2 displays the
conditional effects observed for trust in representative authorities
and institutions (model 3b in Table 2), while Figure 3 does the
same for trust in regulative authorities and institutions (model 4b
in Table 2). Overall, our findings provide empirical support for
the amplification hypothesis (H3a), signaling that, with only few
exceptions, individual justice evaluations exert a stronger impact
on political trust in countries with higher levels of corruption.
Turning to our specific findings, Figure 2A1 shows that the
impact of procedural justice evaluations on trust in representative
authorities and institutions is less pronounced in countries
with more rampant corruption. For trust in representative
authorities and institutions, this is the only finding in line
with the attenuation hypothesis (H3b), indicating that the
11The corresponding findings for resource distribution as contextual-level
indicator for distributive justice are shown in Supplementary Figures 1, 2.
differences in political trust levels between those with positive
and those with negative evaluations of procedural justice are
smaller in corrupt than in clean countries12. Looking at the
conditional effects of egocentric evaluations related to equality
of opportunity, in Figure 2A2, we observe a positive impact
in clean countries and a relatively stronger negative impact in
more corrupt countries. These findings imply two things: first,
in clean countries, citizens with more positive evaluations are
more trustful, whereas in corrupt countries, those with more
positive evaluations are less trustful. Second, the differences in
trust levels between those with positive and those with negative
evaluations will be more pronounced in corrupt countries (see
also panel A2 in Supplementary Figure 3), lending support
to the amplification hypothesis (H3a). With regard to the
conditional impact of sociotropic evaluations of equality of
opportunity, Figure 2A3 certifies that these evaluations become
increasingly relevant for political trust as we move from very
clean to very corrupt countries. Accordingly, the differences in
the levels of political trust between those with positive and those
12See Supplementary Figure 3, which includes predicted values of political trust
based on models 3b and 4b in Table 2. Predicted values based on the models using
resource distribution as a contextual-level moderator (models 3a and 4a inTable 2)
are depicted in Supplementary Figure 4.
Frontiers in Political Science | www.frontiersin.org 13 May 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 642232
Schnaudt et al. Justice Conceptions and Political Trust
FIGURE 3 | Marginal effects of subjective evaluations of justice on trust in regulative authorities and institutions, conditional on country-level corruption. All predictions
based on model 4b in Table 2. Panels marked with an asterisk indicate statistically non-significant cross-level interactions.
with negative justice evaluations are again more pronounced in
more corrupt countries. For egocentric evaluations of income
fairness, Figure 2A4 indicates that in clean countries, hardly
any differences in political trust between those who consider
their own income as fair and those who do not exist. However,
such differences increase as we move from relatively cleaner
to relatively more corrupt countries, with citizens judging
their own incomes as fair in a corrupt environment showing
the lowest levels of trust. Finally, Figure 2A5 indicates that
sociotropic evaluations of income fairness are again more
relevant inmore corrupt countries, with the difference in political
trust between those with positive and those with negative
evaluations being more pronounced with increasing country-
level corruption. Accordingly, those who consider the incomes
of their occupation group to be unfair exhibit the lowest levels
of political trust (see panel A5 in Supplementary Figure 3). In
summary, for trust in representative authorities and institutions,
the conditional effects observed for evaluations of procedural
justice are in line with the attenuation hypothesis (H3b),
while the conditional effects pertaining to egocentric and
sociotropic evaluations regarding equality of opportunity and
income fairness support the amplification hypothesis (H3a).
Virtually identical findings are evident when considering a
country’s resource distribution as contextual-level moderator (see
Supplementary Figure 1).
Figure 3 presents the corresponding findings for trust in
regulative authorities and institutions. Compared to the findings
presented in Figure 2, two major deviations appear. First,
in Figure 3B1, the impact of procedural justice evaluations
is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of
corruption, lending support to the amplification hypothesis
(H3a). Second, Figure 3B2 shows a decreasing impact of
egocentric evaluations of equality of opportunity with increasing
country-level corruption, supporting the attenuation hypothesis
(H3b). For sociotropic evaluations of equality of opportunity
(Figure 3B3), as well as egocentric and sociotropic evaluations
of income fairness (Figure 3B4, B5), the conditional effects
portrayed in Figure 3 match with the earlier findings for trust
in representative authorities and institutions (see Figure 2) and
thus support the amplification hypothesis (H3a). For sociotropic
evaluations of income fairness (Figure 3B5), however, the
conditional effects do not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance. The same pattern of results, albeit not always
statistically significant, is evident when analyzing a country’s
resource distribution as contextual-level moderator of individual
justice evaluations (see Supplementary Figure 2).
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In summary, then, the conditional effects of individual
justice evaluations on political trust observed in our study
largely correspond with the amplification hypothesis (H3a).
Accordingly, the impact of citizens’ justice evaluations on their
political trust is generally more pronounced in political systems
that are hampered by a shortage of actual distributive and
procedural justice themselves.
In addition to this general conclusion, two more specific
results warrant discussion. First, the conditional effects of
procedural justice evaluations differ for trust in representative
and regulative authorities and institutions. While their impact on
trust in representative authorities and institutions is attenuated
in systems with low procedural justice, it is amplified for
trust in regulative authorities and institutions. This finding
suggests that citizens connect the actual level of their political
system’s procedural justice more strongly to the workings of
regulative than of representative authorities and institutions.
Accordingly, our study points to the fact that citizens consider
it the responsibility of regulative authorities and institutions,
such as the courts and the police, to guarantee and uphold
the fairness and integrity of political processes. Second, our
analysis on the micro–macro conditionality of individual justice
evaluations points to systematic differences concerning the
effects of egocentric and sociotropic justice evaluations. For
sociotropic evaluations, there is a generally positive effect on
political trust that is more pronounced in countries with lower
levels of actual distributive and procedural justice. For egocentric
justice evaluations, this amplifying effect is not consistent in
direction, revealing a puzzling pattern: in countries with an
unequal resource distribution or high levels of corruption, those
who consider their personal life chances and incomes as fair
exhibit less trust in political authorities and institutions than
those who perceive their personal circumstances as unfair. As
there is no obvious (post-hoc) explanation for this finding and
the overall effects of egocentric justice evaluations in comparison
to sociotropic and procedural justice evaluations are rather small,
the significance of these findings should not be overstated.
CONCLUSIONS
Adherence to the basic principles of distributive and procedural
justice establishes an essential prerequisite for democratic
legitimacy and thus the long-term viability of any democratic
system. In this study, we contribute to the extant literature
on the link between justice principles and citizens’ legitimacy
beliefs by analyzing the (conditional) effects of individual justice
evaluations and contextual-level distributive and procedural
justice on political trust. Our study demonstrates that citizens’
evaluations of distributive and procedural justice constitute
crucial determinants of trust in political authorities and
institutions and that the impact of individual justice evaluations
on political trust is particularly pronounced in political
systems that suffer from low levels of actual distributive and
procedural justice.
In comparison to previous research, our study offers three
distinct contributions. First, we investigate the relevance of
citizens’ evaluations referring to both distributive and procedural
justice, relying on nuanced operationalizations including citizens’
egocentric and sociotropic justice evaluations. Second, we assess
the micro–macro conditionality of distributive and procedural
justice by analyzing in which ways the influence of individual
justice evaluations on political trust varies across political systems
with different levels of overall distributive and procedural justice.
Third, we explore the effects of distributive and procedural
justice on trust in representative and regulative authorities and
institutions, allowing us to evaluate the respective relevance of
justice concerns for trust in political authorities and institutions
at both the input and output side of the political system.
More specifically, three main findings evolve from the three
consecutive steps of our empirical analysis (see Figure 1).
First, individual evaluations of distributive and procedural
justice matter for citizens’ political trust. In general, the effects
of procedural justice evaluations are stronger than those of
distributive justice. In addition, sociotropic justice considerations
appear to outweigh egocentric concerns when it comes to trust
in political authorities and institutions. These findings extend
and qualify those of earlier albeit less encompassing studies
investigating evaluations of distributive and procedural justice
in isolation (Linde, 2012; Loveless, 2013; Zmerli and Castillo,
2015; Marien and Werner, 2019). Most importantly, they clarify
that, when it comes to political trust, citizens put a premium
on fair and transparent political procedures as well as a fair
allocation of resources and opportunities for society as a whole,
whereas the perceived fairness of their personal situation is
of minor importance only. Second, country-level indicators of
a political system’s actual distributive and procedural justice
exert inconsistent (direct) effects on citizens’political trust. For
trust in representative authorities and institutions, a political
system’s actual levels of neither distributive nor procedural
justice seem to be negligible when simultaneously accounting
for macroeconomic performance. For regulative authorities and
institutions, a political system’s actual adherence to procedural
justice matters for citizens’ political trust even when taking its
macroeconomic performance into account. With these findings,
our study mirrors earlier research documenting mixed effects of
procedural and economic performance on political trust (van
der Meer, 2018). At the same time, however, it provides novel
insights on the importance of distinguishing between different
types of institutions with regard to political trust: citizens appear
to attribute the realization of procedural justice predominantly to
the workings of regulative rather than representative authorities
and institutions. Third, our analysis highlights the micro–
macro conditionality concerning the impact of individual justice
evaluations on political trust. Specifically, our analysis provides
evidence for the existence of amplification effects, signaling
that the impact of individual justice evaluations on citizens’
political trust is strongest in political systems in which the actual
adherence to principles of distributive and procedural justice is
severely compromised. This finding is at odds with earlier studies
on income inequality showing that individual evaluations matter
less (rather than more) in highly unequal countries (Zmerli and
Castillo, 2015; Goubin and Hooghe, 2020). Our study thus points
to the need of revisiting the meaning of income inequality in
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relation to more general matters of distributive justice, such
as the equal distribution of basic resources and opportunities
analyzed here.
Evidently, our findings come with important implications
concerning the general viability of modern democratic systems.
First of all, the fact that citizens’ evaluations of both distributive
and procedural justice are systematically related to their political
trust suggests that citizens attribute responsibility for adhering
or violating basic principles of justice to political authorities
and institutions. Accordingly, with their concrete decisions on
how the political system looks like and the way it is supposed
to function, political authorities and institutions themselves can
shape the extent to which they are perceived as legitimate
by the citizenry. This conclusion can be further qualified
when considering the conditional effects of individual justice
evaluations found across political systems that exhibit a varying
adherence to distributive and procedural justice. In political
systems in which political authorities and institutions abide
by general principles of distributive and procedural justice,
differences in political trust between those who consider their
own or the societal conditions as fair and those who do not
are rather small. In other words, living in an overall just
and fair political system renders the relevance of individual
justice evaluations for political trust a matter of degree rather
than substance. At the same time, the observation that justice
evaluations matter most in political systems that abide the
least by principles of justice implies that citizens with fair and
unfair justice evaluations differ markedly in their political trust,
with one group very content and the other very discontent
with the workings of political authorities and institutions.
In such conditions, political authorities and institutions (and
specific incumbents who themselves may benefit from such
conditions) may see little incentive to change the status quo
and thus to provide all citizens with more equal access to basic
resources and opportunities or to curb corrupt practices, as
they draw their legitimacy from those citizens who perceive the
current conditions as fair. Accordingly, improving the long-term
democratic prospects of those systems that are characterized by
an unequal access to basic resources and opportunities or that are
hampered by rampant corruption may prove to be more difficult
than desired from a democratic perspective (cf. Anderson and
Tverdova, 2003, 105).
These considerations raise further questions on the
relationship between justice evaluations and political trust
that have not been addressed in the present study. The most
obvious one pertains to why citizens may perceive and evaluate
matters of distributive and procedural justice as fair even
in those systems that exhibit severe distortions of justice.
Investigating in more detail what considerations lie behind
citizens’ justice evaluations may help us to clarify the underlying
mechanisms of the justice–trust nexus. Accordingly, a systematic
incorporation of those justice principles that may inform
citizens’ evaluations, such as merit, equality, or need, in future
analyses seems a promising avenue to further advance our
understanding of the relationship between justice conceptions
and political trust and thus the general preconditions of
democratic governance.
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